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Abstract
Our private perception of listening to an individualized playlist
during a jog is very different from the interaction we might
experience at a live concert. We do realize that music is not
necessarily a performing art, such as dancing or theater, while
our demands regarding musical performances are conflicting: We
expect perfect sound quality and the thrill of the immediate.
We want the artist to overwhelm us with her virtuosity and we
want her to struggle, just like a human. We want to engage
with the musical expression and rely on visual and physical
cues. Considering that the ears of today’s listeners are used
to technologically mediated music, in this paper I explore the
unique qualities of musical live performances and examine if our
conception allows for new mechatronic inventions, in particular
robotic musicians, to participate in this art form. Some of
Godlovitch’s main thoughts expounded in his work on “musical
performance” [11] serve as a reference and starting point for
this investigation. His concept of ‘personalism’, which deprives
computer-/program-based musical performances from expressive
potential and creative accomplishment is an issue that I want
to challenge by pointing out new approaches arising from a
reflective discourse on technology, embodiment and expression.
The enquiry conducted illustrates, how in reasoning about
machine performers and algorithmic realization of music, we also
examine the perceptual, physical and social aspects of human
musicianship, reconceptualizing our understanding of a musical
live performance.
Keywords: embodiment, expression, music, performance, robotic
musicianship, technology
1 Introduction: Where the music happens
Even though the music we listen to/consume regularly is recorded1 –
and we listen to it in different settings; on the subway through cheap
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headphones or at home with a potent Hi-Fi system – we still enjoy live
concerts. Not seldom artists perform in fully booked football stadiums.
It is obvious that what we are getting there differs in many ways from the
experience of merely listening to a record, and so are our motivations
to attend a live act. Usually we go there for the performer. We go
there expecting something special and unique, since there can be no
replica of a live performance. We expect the “aura”2 of the immediate
and the possibility of interaction. With our ears being used to studio-
records and the standardized effects (e.g. balancing, layering, tuning)
of technologically mediated music, however, a gap emerges between the
habitual and the actual. In fact, as Black [4, p. 34] points out, this
discrepancy is irreconcilable, since,
[a] fter the movement away from realistic acoustics in popu-
lar music and the rise of multi -track recording (which breaks
performances down into component parts which no longer
need to originate at the same place and time), today most
songs canonically exist as recorded artefacts which often can-
not possibly be reproduced through live performance.
So the sound of recorded and live performed music does not necessarily
have to be the same, and as argued, cannot be the same in most cases,
even though live music and technologically mediated music are imitating
each other [10, p. 199]. Hence, in our regular consumption of music, we
have to acknowledge the fact that we are never just listening to the
artist, but also to the sound engineer (as an off-stage representative).
Technology has changed our perception of what is live. However, we
should not underestimate the audience’s awareness towards music as
an art form, with artistic concepts and the distinctive features of live
performance strongly determining the sound. Thus, our expectations
regarding musical live performance may vary: If you listen to cloud rap
and then go to see Yung Hurn “live”, you are aware that his live vocals
will only be a marginal part of the performance. Then again, when you
buy a ticket to hear Patti Smith, you want it to be “real and raw”. It
goes to show that we generally expect an artistic concept to remain the
same – on a record as well as at a concert –, although different types
of musical performance possess different idiosyncratic sound qualities
that are influenced by technology to a greater or lesser extent, which
clearly affects the acoustic realization or reproducibility of music in a
live setting.
Let’s take another step and presume that the presentation of mu-
sic goes further than sound, by being expressive and performative. But
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what makes it those things? The first intuition tells us that it has to do
with the artist behind the sound: while observing her on-stage, we are
getting involved as she might communicate an idea or a feeling through
her interpretation of the music she makes. If we follow the Romantic-era
understanding of aesthetics, which strongly aligns with the popular view,
this intuition draws upon the motif of a ‘transitive experience’ of musi-
cal expression: an emotional communication from performer to listener
[2, p. 84]. Ideally, in case of communicative success, we are moved by
her expression and we get to understand something about the musical
piece. Under this conception, both the performance of and listening to
music constitute creative acts and require emotional competency from
the agents (composers/performers on and off-stage/listeners) involved. I
want to point out that the listener, beyond the musical piece, might also
understand something about the artist, however, the emotions expressed
in or by a musical piece do not necessarily have to refer to an actual emo-
tional state (past or present), of any of the agents involved. A musical
piece is expressive of emotions3, independently of a felt emotion of the
performer during the performance. At the same time, the capability of
experiencing the emotions that a piece may be expressive of, seems to
be preconditioned somehow: Taking the audience’s perspective, even if
the performer doesn’t have to be sad during the live performance of a
song that is expressive of sadness, we typically expect her to know that
emotion and to be capable of feeling it in a given real-life situation.
Now, this expectation needs reconsidering when taking into account
the musical performance of technologically produced music. For when
we feel that technologically produced music or the mechanical perfor-
mance of music may still strike and move us, the question arises whether
we can still call it a transitive experience? This question may touch
upon genres of electronic music, but more obviously concerns the mu-
sic produced by robotic instruments as automated mechanical construc-
tions (like Fourneaux‘s player piano ‘Pianista‘ from 1863) and robotic
musicians4. Today, we find these equipped with a “combination of musi-
cal, perceptual, and interaction skills with the capacity to produce rich
acoustic responses in a physical and visual manner” [24, p. 28]. Even
though one cannot deny that, somehow, and at some point, humans are
somewhere behind the sounds produced by a machine, when machines
are producing music, humans are not physically making it themselves.
There is a machine at work; however when we as listeners experience
that the acoustic result of the machine does something to us, i.e. moves
us, would we say that the machine has communicated an emotion to us?
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Given that it cannot feel emotions, it seems clear that it cannot commu-
nicate its emotion, but can it, if it is not capable of feeling, communicate
the emotion of a musical piece to us? One answer to this is: Yes, even
when there is no emotion being transmitted, and we cannot make out
a connection between the ‘origin’ and the work of art, we, as listeners
might generate meaning through the ‘embodiment’ of sensory stimuli
implied in musical action. Embodied cognition, playing an increasingly
important role in AI-research – most notably due to works of Brooks
[see e.g. 6] – since 1980 and also re-opening the philosophical debate on
body and mind advocates the following thesis:
Many features of cognition are embodied in that they are
deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body
of an agent, such that the agent’s beyond -the-brain body
plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive
role, in that agent’s cognitive processing. [26, chpt. 3]
If we accept that having a body with sensorimotor capacities is fun-
damentally determining how we, as agents experience things/situations
and that all our cognitive processing therefore is inevitable shaped by
those experiences, then musical performance may serve as an illustrative
example: There is no question that our perception of and reaction to
musical performance is “deeply dependent upon the characteristics of
(our) physical body” [26, chpt. 3] – we hear it (neuroscience states that
music only becomes music “inside of us”, for sounds, as ‘secondary qual-
ities’ along with color or smell, are not in the world around us), we feel
it (resonating), we move to it (dancing, or however you want to call your
rhythmical implementation); these are our ‘tools’ to generate meaning
based on the given stimuli. To put it simply: We experience music the
way we do, precisely because we are “put together” the way we are5. To
conceptualize this type of experience, one may take over an ‘intransitive
perspective’ [2, p. 85], which opens up a territory for technologically gen-
erated music and robotic instruments or robotic musicians within which
to become expressive6.
The understanding of gesture and embodiment as the path-
way for intransitive expressive communication suggests that
listeners create meaning by embodying both visual -sonic and
purely sonic gestures. In this view, listeners create musical
meaning based on their interpretation and embodiment of
sensory stimuli. [2, p. 85]
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As long as the computer is equipped with channels of communication
(e.g. visual-sonic gestures for the given purpose, but also through a voice
or images on a screen), action and perception go hand in hand. Picard
argues, that such channels allow for computers to express emotions, even
though they themselves do not possess them [19, p. 3].
It is now relevant to highlight some differences within the perfor-
mance of technologically generated music, which I will explain in refer-
ence to the live performance of electronic music, automats like player
pianos, and robotic musicians. Firstly, when it comes to electronic mu-
sic, in many cases its live performance is generated by a DJ, who acts on
the basis of an existing pool of musical information, adding her physical
presence and technical skills to the performance. For an audience, the
artistic human body on stage facilitates the traceability of the acous-
tic result and visualizes musical embodiment. Player pianos and other
automats by contrast, lack the perceivable physical presence of the per-
forming artist, as they are playing “themselves” from “within”. This
absence makes it hard for us to acknowledge the live performance as
such, even if we, the audience are aware of the algorithm at work and
can therefore deduce what creates the sound (just like we know the wind
harp is not playing by itself) – something seems to be missing.
So far, our expectations of a musical live performance (section 2 will
examine conceptions of ‘performance’ more closely) can roughly be sum-
marized as follows: a unique experience of acoustic signals as musical
expression produced by a ‘performing body’, which is physically per-
ceivable and allows for interaction; in many cases we also have certain
expectations regarding the artistic concept or musical genre based on
our prior experiences and knowledge. Why not already put forward the
question, whether robotic musicians are able to meet these expectations
and collect some pertinent features: Robotic musicians are producing
sounds in a perceivable way (the mechanical apparatus converts digi-
tal musical instructions into physically generated acoustic sound; [24,
p. 28]). They combine algorithmic analysis and response capabilities
(which we typically associate with human artists). These qualities allow
them to interact with other musicians on stage7 and accentuate the musi-
cal expression, over gestural channels as sonic nuances, i.e. articulation,
timbre, dynamics, phrasing and visual aspects, with certain degrees of
freedom for dynamic physical behavior, such as rhythmical body move-
ment8. Though tentative yet, this quick analysis of the differences be-
tween human live performance and technologically produced music and
those within the latter suggests that viewed from an intransitive per-
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spective, the live performance of the robotic musicians seems to endorse
the potential of such machines to convey and inspire the expression of
emotions contained by a musical piece [2, p. 86].
Whether one accepts this point of view is clearly also dependent on
a crucial question of demarcation: when we conceptualize a musical pro-
duction of a robot, do we see the robot playing the instrument or is it
rather that the robot and the sound-emitting body form one instrument?
Typically, robotic musicians are designed to perform on one particular
instrument, i.e. they are designed for this one specific symbiosis. This
means that if we take apart the instrument and robot, formerly consti-
tuting one instrument, and let’s say replace the marimba with a flute,
the robot would no longer be able to perform. Now if we take away the
marimba from a human artist and replace it with another instrument,
the human musician may equally fail to adapt and to achieve the desired
acoustic results immediately, but in most cases we can expect her to be
physically and cognitively capable of producing some sounds intuitively.
Following the unique, or even ontological symbiosis of the robot with its
instrument, it remains debatable whether we can talk of a performing
body in the case of the robotic musician.
2 Playing it. Concepts of performance, technology and cre-
ativity
This section is meant to reflect on the key terms my investigation is
drawing upon, with the aim to challenge dominant views and experi-
ment with new perspectives. There are various concepts of performance.
Relevant for the issues discussed in this paper are those, which con-
centrate on performance in performing arts, usually consisting of the
following elements: time, space, the performer’s body and a relation-
ship between audience and performer, plus the artistic content, whereby
content, time and space form a unity. Godlovitch’s idealized model of
musical performance draws upon the theme of techne, presenting perfor-
mance as an “agent-centered intentional enterprise which invokes special
skills to create musical experiences for attentive listeners” [11, p. 4]. He
also addresses the spatiotemporal aspect in the description of a “highly
intricate event comprising players, sounds, works and listeners in a rit-
ual setting” [11, p. 1]. Building on this model and accommodating it
to new forms of technologically mediated musical performances, Black
emphasizes the “qualities of the person or persons producing music in
the context of performance” [4, p. 35], and adds as an extending aspect
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“some kind of ongoing, real-time feedback loop controlled by the body
of the performer” [4, p. 47]. Following this view, a skilled DJ, just like a
singer using Autotune at a live concert, would make ‘a performance’. A
machine that is just producing programmed sounds, however, would not
fall under this definition. An interactive robotic musician on the other
hand could, although we have to be aware of the fact that the robot is
not improvising the algorithms but improvising on algorithms9 (a fact I
will address in more detail at the end of section 3).
I am now taking up Godlovitch’s reference to techne and bringing
technology (and technological innovation) into play, having its etymolog-
ical roots in the very term, which is generally understood as materialized
logos, intended by a human. The meaning can be expanded though, and
for the given context I want to refer to a notion, illustrated by Coeck-
elbergh [8, p. 504f.], interpreting techne as a kind of poiesis (bringing
into being; the prevalent understanding of the term as the cause that
brings non-existing into existing also takes all forms of art as arising
from it). He draws on Heidegger, who argues that the connection of
the concepts (techne and poiesis) lies in the drive of bringing-forth, and
that this process is to be located not in itself (like the physical drive of
bringing-forth), but in another – the craftsman or artist [13]. Technolog-
ical innovations and art both become part of this concept. Coeckelbergh
points out that this conception amends the role of the human as cre-
ator: he becomes a mere participant in the ‘performative process’ (for a
further understanding of the term see below).
The work of art or the artefact is not exclusively the result
of human intention, it also involves – so we may interpret
Heidegger – the “participation” of the material. There is a
process of making and revealing in which both humans and
non-humans take part. [8, p. 505]
This idea makes us question the common view of art and technologi-
cal innovations as concepts that get realized through material only due
to the artists/creators/masters will and intention. I want to instance
a practical thought regarding musical performance that might not do
justice to the complexity of the concepts sketched above, however I still
consider it helpful: The (musical and technological) tools (as ‘material’)
involved are participating in the performance, as in the end it is them,
who are causing the sounds we perceive. There is no musical performance
without additional tools (one might respond: “What about a cappella
singing?”, but even there, a tuning fork or microphones might be at
use) and the performing artist has to learn how to react to the tools and
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work with them (this also counts for singers which have to work with [the
physical attributes of] their voices). They may get out of tune, because
of temperature changes or a string may snap, because it was pulled to
hard, there may be acoustic feedback (ringing noise) from a (monitor)
speaker on stage, because the output of the speaker was picked up by
the microphone, creating a positive loop gain – whatever the struggles
or circumstances: the tools may cooperate or not.
Coming from this perspective it is easy to see that there are no mere
passive tools in musical performance; but reflecting on our traditional
concept of human musicianship, this is not what we’re believing in. We
are talking of “mastering the guitar” or “slaying a tune” and thus seem
far from awarding them agency. Robotic musicians may serve as a bridge
that refines our perception of tools and artists in a musical performance,
as they merge elements of what we perceive as “passive” and “active”.
Once we understand that the human artist herself is working/playing
with algorithms (compositions, scores) and inevitably cooperating with
the material, we may allow technological innovations to participate in
the ‘sacred domain’ of music (and music as performing art)10. The idea
of the technological innovation as an active element in artistic or sci-
entific work processes roots in the revolutionary peak of the Romantic
era (1820–1850). Tresch depicts “the romantic machine” in his epony-
mous book [22] as “flexible, active, and inextricably woven into circuits
of both living and inanimate elements” [22, xi], accompanying new, and
later neglected understandings of nature (“as growing, complexly in-
terdependent, and modifiable” [22, xi]) and knowledge (“as an active,
transformative intervention in which human thoughts, feelings, and in-
tention – in short, human consciousness – played an inevitable role in
establishing truth” [22, xi]). Now I do not ask you to go back in time
and reanimate these conceptions; what I am suggestion though – with
help of the theories outlined above – is a reflection on the function, role
and (revelatory) potential of tools in artistic processes, such as musical
performance.
In this regard the following critical question may be raised: “How
do the performing bodies (including tools) on stage and the work of
art connect?” This is an important question, as it is examining what
the artist’s contribution to the performance actually consists in. Is she
representative for the ‘space’, where the creative impulse for the workings
of art is located? Is she proofing that the performance does not consist
in mere sound?
I want to introduce the term ‘performative process’, as it illustrates
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that reducing performance to the mere presentation of an artwork (out-
come) falls short. The term comprises the preparation (process of cre-
ation) as well as the action (making and revealing) in the given setting
and the participation/reaction of the audience in the moment of the
presentation. This is important, for the separation of the two aspects
‘process’ and ‘product’ does not make sense if we take the status of the
product to be constituted by the process and that in the end the process
is judged by its product. Coeckelbergh further elaborates this thought
within the context of subjective and objective criteria for a work of art
and, just as I do in this paper, draws upon the new presence of techno-
logical inventions in arts to assess what these criteria may be [7, p. 295].
As he explains, a machine might perform a musical work, but we cannot
foretell how the audience will react to it and whether the audience will
recognize the produced music as art. This applies to artistic machines
as well as aspiring human artists. So whenever there is a performative
process, one may say, art might emerge from it, or not [7, p. 295]. This
view is cogent, especially in the context of live music. Let us think of the
following, for example: Whether you listen to a recording or an orches-
tral live performance of Bach’s “Matthäus-Passion”, it is rather unlikely
that you will question the artistic value of the work you are confronted
with. But let us say you discover a new artist because YouTube sug-
gested a taste-customized video based on your previous listenings, then
you might attend a concert to verify if she succeeds to fulfill your expec-
tations also in that context. If her live performance convinces you, then
you might say “Yes, her music has artistic value”.
Godlovitch’s imaginary piano competition scene [11, chpt. 6] de-
scribes how a panel of blindfolded judges, unaware of the fact that all
participants are computer programs driving conventional pianos and im-
pressed by the level of talent, choose player #8 as the winner. As they
find out who (what) was performing, they are shocked and call it a mis-
trial. There are two questions Godlovitch raises: i) “Are we witness to
a musical performance here?” and ii) “Have such eventualities hope of
full standing in our musical culture or are they artistically aberrant?”
[11, p. 125]; and I want to pursue these questions in a moment (sec-
tion 3). Yet before, I would like to emphasize that what the judges
are confronted with is pure outcome. They have no knowledge of the
‘creative process’, i.e. the internal workings of the program. However,
that is a fundamental part, when it comes to artistic creativity. The
same counts for computational creativity. What the Turing test shows,
is how an outcome is not necessarily representative of an original artistic
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idea. It is also completely disconnected from the creator and intention-
ally we would say that that feels wrong. Even if we want to question
the dictating role of the creator – she still remains a participant in the
process.
So it seems that it is in the process of creation, where we want to
find meaning – meaning we put to use for understanding the output and
being able to judge it. With regard to artistic creation, two prevalent
views are confronting each other: self-expression (romantic) of something
inner, and mimesis (antiquity), the imitation of something outside. We
can see that there are parallels between the former view and the transi-
tive perspective concerning musical (artistic) expression. Both exclude
machines a priori from the artistic processes. There might be a chance
for machine musicianship to become a part of performative art within
the theories of mimesis and the intransitive perspective, if we acknowl-
edge these views as valid. What mimesis should not mean in this context
though, is imitation of human artistic creation by machines11. A player
piano that imitates Glenn Gould’s Bach-interpretations does not satisfy
the idea12. Godlovitch’s imaginary participants may fail many of the
claims that would make a musical performance (now we come back to
his questions, see above): they lack a body (when the winner is called,
it gets respectfully laid on a disc-stand), their action and reaction is
spatiotemporally detached from the process of creation and what they
present to us is pure output13. Then again, we might generate meaning
from the musical piece (intransitively), and we might acknowledge the
process of creation, once we get to know how the program “plays the
algorithm”.
3 The making of an artist. On personalism, artistic agency,
and being (creatively) expressive
Godlovitch seeks to find an answer to his questions concerning artistic
agency and merit in musical performances (see above) in the matter of
‘witnessing’ and puts the ball back in the judges’ court (the decision-
making panel as in the piano competition sketched above; I assume that
in the context of a traditional concert not only the domain experts, but
the common audience is entitled to judge, whether or not they are wit-
nessing a musical performance). Just like in boxing matches, it is the
judges’ responsibility to recognize fouls, withdraw points, and honor the
skilled. The metaphor connotes primarily technical skills and Godlovitch
seems to realize that this is not really doing justice to artistic perfor-
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mance. What he introduces then, is the concept of the ‘personalist’,
who anticipates “the individualistic in performance, the person-centered
particularities of performance and manner” [11, p. 141]. It should re-
mind us that the main reason why we even attend a concert is the person
on stage. We observe her, fallible like us, exposing her unique qualities.
Noë goes even further than that, arguing that in all genres of popular
music it is the artistic person we are interested in; here the music serves
mainly as a medium to act out a specific image (embedding social, cul-
tural, and political aspects) [18, chpt. 15]. That way the artist is putting
“us” on display, as a representative for a certain life-style at a certain
time and place; her musical practice is influenced by and looping back
to the living practice of the audience.
Now, Godlovitch, who is describing his program-players in an
uncanny-theme as “endowed with an otherworldly essence” [11, p. 140]
concludes that artistic merit is not possible, if nothing whatever “in-
side” [11, p. 140] the artist counts. Let me make a remark here: It
seems difficult to grasp, what the “inside” exactly consists in – in a
personal story of human life, in emotions, in social, cultural, political
imprints? Additionally, as pointed out above, artistic creation is not
necessarily bound to self-expression of something “inner”, but can man-
ifest through the imitation of something “outside”. Levinson’s ‘persona
theory’ [16] offers an instructive approach to this issue. The core idea is
the following: if we acknowledge the fact, that a musical piece itself (or
the performing artist, when it comes to machines) does not possess any
emotions (although it can be expressive of emotions), we may experience
the performance of music as the expression of a fictional musical agent
or ‘persona’ that is completely independent of the performer. This is in-
teresting for our question concerning person-centered artistic merit out
of multiple reasons. Firstly, it makes the attachment of human emotions
to objects, such as a musical piece, appear less disconcerting. Secondly,
it also explains, how the performance of an artistic group (an orchestra,
a band) may generate one unique expression that does not depend on
the individual performing components, but rather on (the story of) a
fictional agent. And thirdly, this view invites non-human performers to
create music that is able to be expressive of anything that a fictional
agent may experience. All of this obviously depends on the imagination
of the willing listener, who is ready to engage with this understanding of
musical expression. A competent listener, who does not need this “trick”
of imaginative engagement in order to generate meaning for a musical
piece might criticize this view, as Davies argues [cf. 9, p. 189].
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Robinson expands Levinson’s ideas, as she argues that particularly
music in the Western tradition evokes a persona-oriented listening. She
further adds that some aesthetic concepts, such as Romanticism, do
claim that the artist is actually experiencing or at least engaging with
the emotions being expressed [20, p. 325]. In these cases, we cannot dif-
ferentiate between a fictional persona and the performer (or composer).
When it comes to the value of expressive music, Robinson argues that we
typically appreciate art, which allows us to pseudo-experience an emo-
tion [20, p. 290] – art as a sort of playground, so to say (these are not the
author’s exact words, rather my pointed view on it). I want to provide
some examples to illustrate this idea: When you attend an underground
punk concert, you may engage with rebellion or anger in a ritualized
setting. Listening to Rammstein (a German rock band, founded in 1994
which is often associated with the genre of “Neue Deutsche Härte”) al-
lows you to experiment with the feeling of hatred or what it is like to
enjoy BDSM; while listening to Chopin’s Prelude in A Minor (Op. 28,
No. 2) might give you a taste of Weltschmerz.
At this point, I want take a step back to the agent-oriented un-
derstandings of performance and refer to the concept of agency as the
capability of individuals to have an original impact on the world. If
we understand action as the expression of identity (or individuality?),
we also create a link to Godlovitch’s claim of personalism. My (Arend-
tian) understanding of action includes the attributes that action cannot
be predetermined and that it leaves space for variability and interac-
tion. We can differentiate action (from fabrication), because the act
happens in the here and now, which implies physical presence and im-
mediateness, mirroring the particularities of a live performance. A strict
interpretation of this thought excludes technology from agency, because
in technology the action is not resulting from intentionality but from an
algorithm. From a phenomenological perspective it seems essential that
the audience experiences a musical performance as spatiotemporally im-
mediate, i.e. arising on-site before their ears and eyes. Harper uses the
term jouissance (as the combination of action, iteration and aura) in
order to describe the pleasure that only live music evokes in us [12]. So
let us say that the here and now are uncontestable factors for creating
this kind of pleasure and investigate what ‘expression within action’ can
mean from this point of view.
Public behaviour is just the natural cue for beliefs about the
performer’s circumstances and inner states which both cause
and are occasioned by the music created in performance. Our
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unhesitant positing of these inner states affects our views of
the expressive richness of the performance or the structural
clarity of the technique. [11, p. 141]
What I particularly want to highlight in this quote is the link that we
seem to create between the visually and acoustically perceivable expres-
sion of performance and quality designations, such as “structural clarity
of technique”. This is important in regards of robotic musicianship,
for all forms of program-based musical robotics are known to be capa-
ble of performing technically difficult sequences flawlessly while lacking
the kind of expressive uniqueness that is typically associated with hu-
man musicians who develop their own – often recognizable – style and
sound (think of Glenn Gould again). We do know that every instrument
theoretically sounds different with every performer playing it. This is
primarily due to laws of physics (e.g. physical attributes such as lung
volume, resonance body, qualities of skin and flesh, proportions, but
also finger technique or embouchure). However, that sound information
is not enough to make out the artist (and her unique style) “behind it”.
Nuances, such as steering articulation, timbre, dynamics and phrasing
are pivotal when it comes to rendering a piece of music creatively ex-
pressive. Imagine a pianist interpreting a challenging piece (e.g. a piano
concerto by Prokofiev), and try to picture her without any sound – I take
it that you are visualizing a moving body, accentuating different themes
and dynamics. A study [23] from UCL professor (and classical pianist)
Tsay shows that we even go as far as taking the visually perceivable in-
terpretative physical behavior as a proof for artistic quality prior to the
actual sound of a performance. So it seems that even if we understand
musical performance from a perspective that allows intransitive expres-
sion of something outside, we still need visual feedback connecting to the
sound, to proof that there is a creative act happening before our ears
and eyes.
Godlovitch questions, if it were reasonable to request performing ma-
chines to be creatively expressive in this way (“Is this excessive?” [11,
p. 128]). 20 years after Godlovitch’s publication designers of robotic
musicians like Weinberg or Barton are and have been working exactly
on that aspect. This field of research describes the expressive capabili-
ties of mechatronic instruments in terms of “the number of controllable
sonic parameters as well as the resolution of these parameters” [2, p. 85].
Bretan, Hoffman and Weinberg are also investigating the “emotionally
expressive dynamic physical behaviors in robots”, as they have been cre-
ating an “artificial emotional intelligence system, for robots, with both a
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generative and a perceptual aspect” [5, p. 1], by using music as a means
to engage participants and encourage them to dance (in an interactive ex-
perience). “Shimi” for example is an interactive speaker-doc, possessing
five degrees of freedom that allow certain postures and dynamic gestures
to represent fundamental human emotions14. Although “Shimi” does not
have a face, it is expressive through motion. The researchers build upon
recent studies of musical gesture that show how musical expression can
manifest through the embodied experience of the auditor [2, p. 85]. This
liberates robotic music from the necessity to mimic human performers,
opening up a different path of expression: the exploration of their, i.e.
the robots’, own creative goals, which are unattainable for human artists
(e.g. improvisational algorithms, speed and timbre control). Collabora-
tions with robotic instruments (such as Scott Barton’s human-playable
robotic “Cyther”) and human-robot joint improvisations (jamming with
Weinberg’s et al. percussionist “Haile” or marimba player “Shimon”,
see below) are combining these computational and mechanic capabili-
ties with the qualities of human musicianship; whereby the human and
the machine musicians are learning from one other. In 2009, Wein-
berg as lead researcher of The Robotic Musicianship Group at Georgia
Tech’s Center for Music Technology introduced their four-armed robotic
marimba player “Shimon”, who is able to react to music, improvise, and
play along with human musicians. In addition to that, he provides the
visual and physical cues we seem to depend upon in our engagement
with and judgement of musical performance via dynamic physical be-
havior (rhythmical head nodding, leaning in at difficult parts, “looking
at” ensemble members when finding a common groove). Having watched
it myself, I have to admit that their performance is indeed inspiring15
and it becomes difficult to deny these elaborate machines their expressive
potential. So I may say, our conception of musical performance expands,
when watching and experiencing a robotic musician’s live performance;
this way it is also putting on display and reorganizing our understanding
of human musicianship.
I will try to roughly sketch how the real-time improvisational al-
gorithms work, referring to Weinberg’s et al. work on “A Real-Time
Genetic Algorithm in Human-Robot Musical Improvisation” [25]. Here,
the robot (“Haile” and “Shimon” are two representatives) is equipped
with perceptual tools that enable to listen to and analyze MIDI and
audio input from human players. It is also equipped with pre-stored
human-generated musical phrases that serve to be compared to the new
information and evolve through mutation and crossover functions. The
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improvisational algorithm is creating fitting responses to the live input
in real-time, by fragmenting the latter into short phrases and combin-
ing it with the internalized knowledge of relevant material [25, pp. 351-
353]. These responses allow human musicians to actually interact with
the robotic musician in a live performance, while both parties are chal-
lenged in, what I would call their improvisational routine. Two robotic
musicians improvising with each other would just build upon modula-
tions of pre-stored phrases, while human musicians also tend to getting
caught up in improvisational patterns or conventions. The differences
between the performers, as Rowe shows, mean “that the human also
acquires a new degree of freedom in invoking and directing real-time al-
gorithms through different styles of performance” [21, p. 7]. The classic
call-and-response dynamics may additionally be challenged by a feature
that allows the robot to occasionally interrupt or ignore the human mu-
sician [25, p. 356]. The question is: How far does it go? I find the aspect
of risking musical breaks (irritations) or failure in a musical performance
highly interesting and I want to pursue this issue in the last section of
this paper. Failure in the given context might imply physical, technical
or sonic, as well as interpretative or expressive limitations.
4 Sweat and tears: struggles and empathy
When we just listen to (recorded) music, we primarily seek an elabo-
rated sound experience. If we are able to observe the artist during the
performance of her music though, her body (her sweat, her exertion),
her reactions, her interactions, her facial expressions – we realize that
she is human just like us, and on this grounds we appreciate her effort
even more. We know that she could fail, but she is risking it and we
feel for her. Although human and machine artists both aim for flawless
performance, and therefore create the risk of failing at it, we do not
really expect the machine to fail, at least not technically. We rather
expect that it was designed to perform in a certain way (which would
also entail that we neither expect it to surprise us in a positive sense)
and that is what constitutes a big difference in the live-setting. We do
not expect a machine to be nervous, to sweat, be exhausted or strug-
gle. I assume that that bores us. Maybe this has also to do with the
malicious joy we experience, when witnessing a successful person’s (pro-
fessional or private) failure; a phenomenon that is known to be called
“Schadenfreude” in German. Normally we do not want an artist to fail
– we may even keep our fingers crossed for them or sympathize with
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their nervousness – but just the thought that they are not save from it
is reconciling. Now, if we were to witness a robotic musician reaching its
limits (physically struggling to hit a note, keeping up with the rhythm,
or failing to respond in an improvisational setting), would we react em-
pathetic? Would we say: “Wow, it’s giving its all. I can feel its struggle.
That’s touching.”? This question reminds me of a passage in E.T.A.
Hoffmann’s dark romantic Kunstmärchen “Der Sandmann” (published
in 1816, here cited as [14]) that depicts the protagonist Nathanael fol-
lowing an invitation from physics professor Spalanzani, who introduces
his “daughter” Olimpia, a beautiful automaton, into society. Olimpia
performs for the guests, playing the grand piano and singing an aria
di bravura with an almost piercingly clear voice. Nathanael, standing
in the background, is intrigued by Olimpia’s appearance and observes
her through a spotting scope that he bought from Coppola (a trader in
barometers and lenses and dubious doppelgänger of Coppelius, the al-
chemist who Nathanael holds responsible for his father’s death). Before
Nathanael’s eyes Olimpia becomes increasingly vivid, and he perceives
the artificial traces in her performance (blaring trill, factitious roulade)
as deep emotional expressions. As he starts to dance with her, he is
surprised by her cold surface and her demanding rhythmic rigidity. He
also starts to notice that everybody else in the room acts very suspicious
towards Olimpia – they are estranged by her eerie spiritless look and
feel. Because they are threatened by the uncanniness, they are more
than happy to detect flaws in the performing machine and laugh about
them. Also Nathanael is obviously deluded in his perception, as he wants
Olimpia to be perfect. But what if we didn’t expect a machine to per-
form flawlessly; what if we allowed it to reach its limits? Would it gain
in artistic credibility?
Whether or not mimicked or staged struggle would be effective or
convincing for us as an audience to appreciate a robotic musician’s per-
formative effort is another question. We may assume that researchers
studying robots are very aware of the fact that we perceive certain im-
perfections as human traits, but as it is, robotic instruments naturally
possess their own idiosyncrasies and limitations (such as micro-variation
in timing caused by physical forces, [2, p. 86]). Such imperfections bring
to mind that there is actually an effort behind the machines’ perfor-
mance, and that can be evocative for an audience. However, we would
have to be able to witness the struggle, to perceive it in an immediate
physical expression. Then we might empathize as we do with the human
artist. By shifting our focus from the detection of flaws in the construct
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to the actual musical expression, we also start to fully allow it to touch
us and make it – with our contribution – a musical performance.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I examined unique qualities of musical live performances
and questioned whether our conception allows for new mechatronic in-
ventions, in particular robotic musicians to participate in this art form.
I started with ideas on the key terms performance (comparison of the
transitive and intransitive perspective), technology (the creator as par-
ticipant in the performative process) and creativity (expression of some-
thing inner and imitation of something outside) and reflected the role
of the artist within these frameworks. Godlovitch’s imaginary piano
contest served to illustrate what player programs might lack: a body,
spatiotemporal immediacy of action and reaction, and the connection
between the process of creation and the output. Further questions con-
cerned the person-centered qualities of the performance, artistic agency
and expressivity. It became apparent that new designs of robotic mu-
sicians meet many of the features we ascribe to a human artists (e.g.
physical and visual cues that allow expressive musical interaction) and
that they do not need to imitate human artists in order to evoke mu-
sical expression. The result shows that we should not necessarily ask,
whether machines are musicians, but rather how machines are helping
us to understand that (the creative expression of) a musical performance
is not exclusively created by the performing artist, but constituted by
the participation of the tools as well as the audience’s perception and
reaction. Robotic musicians are putting (perceptual, physical, techni-
cal, cultural and social aspects of) human musicianship on display and
therefore allow us to reconceptualize our understanding of it.
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Notes
1 And these records are ranging in quality from established data-compression for-
mats (e.g. MP3, AAC, Vorbis) as used e.g. for iTunes or Spotify, to the un-
compressed CD and the analog phonograph records, with the classic LP vinyl
currently seeing a revival amongst the audiophile listeners.
2 I am deliberately referencing Benjamin here. A concert as a ritualized perfor-
mance (“the location of its original use value“ [3, iv]), happening at a certain
time and space stands in opposition to the performing artist’s latest record. So
yes, only the concert is unique; however, what we learn from Benjamin is: the
record has been “designed for reproducibility“ [3, iv]. This thought also implies
that mechanical reproduction reverses the (social) function of art (from being
based on rituals to being based on politics).
3 I thank an anonymous reviewer for the demarcation between “to express” and
“to be expressive of”.
4 Kapur offers a comprehensive historical review of musical robots [15].
5 This sentence is strongly inspired by my reading of Noë [18, cf. p. 185].
6 Barton and Kemper are introducing the term of mechatronic expression to “dif-
ferentiate expressive meaning in performances that include robotic instruments
from music performed by humans” [2, p. 85].
7 In the past years Barton has been developing the software and hardware system
HARMI (Human and Robotic Musical Improvisation) [1] that allows human-
robot improvisation; Weinberg et al. have been working on a Real-Time Genetic
Algorithm [25] in Human-Robot Musical Improvisation.
8 Weinberg’s and Driscoll’s concept of robotic musicianship [24] considers not only
the capability of sonic nuance, but the visual aspects of performance as well as
our ability to imbue meaning by anthropomorphizing these instruments.
9 I thank an anonymous reviewer for making me aware of the importance of this
distinction.
10 Lewis‘s project of the computer music composition “Voyager“ [17] is a revealing
work in this context, demonstrating how “notions about the nature and function
of music become embedded into the structure of software-based musical systems
and compositions“, as “interactions with these systems tend to reveal character-
istics of the community of thought and culture that produced them“ [17, p.33].
11 Godlovitch differentiates between “simulators“ and “(artist)-adulators“ [11, p.
126f.].
12 Regarding the issues in this paper it might be more apt to refer to original compo-
sitions only, which make it easier for machines to participate equally. Otherwise
“imitation” will always be the first accusation, since we cannot help but compare
different interpretations of the same piece (and everyone loses against Gould).
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13 Although Godlovitch imagines them as sophisticated player programs, each indi-
vidual, operating autonomously and guaranteeing interpretive diversity, reacting
to acoustics and fitted with musical theories and historical data.
14 The authors name happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise and disgust [5].
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